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## SWUtanic?

The

After listening to the USEC Our own analysis projected enrichment hearing on Thursday (see that it preceded the the Titanic by a day, one parallels between USEC's of that "unsinkable" ship.

prices would fall. In our February 1998 story on page 2) and realizing Enrichment Market Outlook, the lower part of our base case range (the anniversary of the sinking of portion that most applied to the U.S. market), showed that prices would dip cannot but help to draw some to \$85 and then to \$80. Admittedly, this has occurred somewhat more quickly current situation and the fate than that forecast showed. However, in that same report, our low price scenario, which had a rather large

The image in the hearing was probability of 30%, projected price clear. USEC's ship was going going below \$80 by as early as last down, and the Congressmen year. clearly worried about its

future viability. Bodies were already in the water, in the person of laid-off GDP workers and the shares at premium prices. Were U.S. uranium that they alleged USEC was dumping? Congress asked whether USEC's management had a plan for rescuing the company, perhaps wondering if they were simply rearranging the deck chairs as the ship continued to sink.

Just before USEC's privatization, we also forecasted that uranium prices would be under downward pressure, stockholders who had purchased USEC returning to the \$8 range, based on the inventory transferred to USEC and miners far behind, weighted down by the USEC's announced sales plans at that time. Even lower prices were forecast for the case where DOE sold its remaining inventory. However, as noted at the time, political pressure would likely keep DOE from selling this material.

It went further than this, getting personal foresee. With a high-cost technology at times. In questioning Mr. Timbers about his compensation, the Congressmen seemed to be wondering enrichment market were not good. It why the captain refused to go down (financially) with his ship. In discussing his severance package, were they also taking note that Mr. Timbers had his own without negatively impacting price. As personal lifeboat?

None of this was very difficult to and a strong U.S. dollar working against it, USEC's prospects in the was also clear that the uranium market could not absorb the quantities of uranium that USEC planned to sell we said in the analysis, it was not even necessary for USEC to sell as much as planned, just that the market perceived as well.

And then there is the HEU. Before its launching, USEC was entrusted to give that this would be the case. As an safe passage to this precious cargo, and afterthought, and it is always an willingly took it on board. However, soon afterthought, it was clear that the after it was underway, USEC found that conversion market would be punished this cargo was slowing it down, and threatened to jettison it, unless aid was given. There were other, faster ships from Europe passing it on the way to the are left to ponder the fate of not only U.S. market.

Now Congress and the administration USEC, but the entire front-end of the U.S. nuclear fuel cycle. It is clear that

There is one major difference between they are not encouraged by what they the Titanic, which struck an iceberg, and see. In this respect, Rep. Strickland

USEC's story. USEC's sinking has been remarked that while USEC could fail, more gradual than that of the Titanic, although it has picked up momentum recently. In the hearing, Mr. Timbers brought up the notion that USEC faced its own iceberg in the form a fundamental change in the enrichment market that occurred after it privatized.

This is simply not the case. remarked that while USEC could fail, Congress would not allow the U.S. nuclear fuel industry to fail. The question is what can be done to salvage the situation. Will NRC revok USEC's charter after reviewing its financial viability? Will the HEU oversight committee take the HEU cargo away from USEC? Will an effort

Long before USEC set sail, cries were heard throughout the industry that we would see Elvis before AVLIS. Smart people like Joe Stiglitz and Tom Neff warned of inherent conflicts between privatization and stewardship of the HEU before USEC slips below the surface, deal that could require the U.S. to bail out the ship. Their warnings went unheeded.

remarked that while USEC could fail, Congress would not allow the U.S. nuclear fuel industry to fail. The question is what can be done to salvage the situation. Will NRC revoke USEC's charter after reviewing its financial viability? Will the HEU oversight committee take the HEU cargo away from USEC? Will an effort be made to impound USEC's ship, in essence taking it back into the government, as implied in the hearing? Perhaps most importantly, there is the question of whether Congress and the administration will act quickly enough, before USEC slips below the surface, sucking the U.S. industry along with it.

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